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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
ORVIL ANDREWS & SONS,
d/b/a NEBO BLACK ANGUS
RANCH, ORVIL ANDREWS,
and NELDON ANDREWS,
Defendants/Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 18239

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
I.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The statement of Appellant is accurate.

II.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The statement of Appellant is basically accurate,
however, it fails to set forth the totality of relevant
procedural occurrances and issues decided in the lower court.
Procedurally, in addition to granting Defendants'/
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court
specifically rejected and denied a Motion for Summary Judgment
asserted by Plaintiff/Appellant on the same issues as presented
in Respondents' motion.
With respect to omitted issues, the lower court in
it's written decision rendered on or about October 26, 1981,

-1-
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held, that, in addition to not being an "automobile" as that
term is defined by the subject insurance policy, the vehicle
owned and operated by Respondents was and remains a "farm
implement not subject to Utah motor vehicle registration and
design[ed] for use principally off public roads." (R. 135)
III.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The statement.of Appellant is accurate.
IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The statement.of Appellant is basically accurate,
however, several relevant and arguably controlling facts have
been omitted.
As alleged by Appellant, Respondents own and operate a
2800 acre cattle farm in Juab County, State of Utah (R. 132).
In connection with the operation of said farm, Respondents
purchased and had constructed a "feeder unit", consisting of a
"Gehl" animal feeder box assembly mounted on a "Ford" truck
chassis (R. 46, 59, 67-102, 132).

Said feeder unit was

designed solely for the purpose of spreading feed in
Respondent's fields and is not fit nor suitable for other
purpose (R. 48, 49, 67-102, 135).

Said unit, as acknowledged

by Appellant, was used by Respondents for this purpose and, in
fact, was used exclusively therefor (R. 60, 132, 135,
Deposition of Orvil Andrews, pp. 4, 7, 14, and Deposition of
Neldon Andrews, pp. 13, 14, 16, 17, 25, and 28 )-. ·
Indeed, at the time of the subject accident the feeder
unit was being utilized by Respondents in connection with said
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

feeding operations (R. 60, 133, 136).

Admittedly, the unit was

..

located on a public highway at the point of collision, but it
was only there momentarily on its way to another feeding area
maintained by Respondents.
The operation of said unit on the public road was only
incidental to its intended use and was, by no means, necessary
to its operation nor its ability to perform that function for
which it was designed.

Similarly, the only time said unit was

located on public roads was in connection with its transmission
between certain fields maintained by Respondents (R. 136).

It

was neither economical nor practical to use it on such roads
for any other purpose (Deposition of Neldon Andrews, p. 25).
As alleged by Appellant, Respondents believed and at
all times considered the subject feeder unit to be personal
property "just like other farm machinery", and indeed, were
confirmed in that belief by Juab County, which, for tax
purposes, assessed it as a non-licensed vehicle

(R. 107).

At

all times the subject unit was, without objection, listed on
Respondent's affidavits to said taxing authority as an item of
personal property (R. 107).
Respondents take exception to the description offered
by Appellants with regard to the precise manner in which the
subject accident occurred.

The particulars thereof are not as

yet known, are not relevant hereto and do not aid the court in
resolving the issues germane to this appeal.
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Finally, the subject insurance policy was, in all
0

respects, drafted, prepared and constructed by Appellant.
the exception of executing the same,

Responden~s

With

were in no way

involved in the drafting, preparation or selection of its
terms, conditions or language.
V.

ARGUMENT

THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT
THE SUBJECT FEEDER UNIT WAS NOT AN "AUTOMOBILE"
UNDER APPELLANT'S FARM LIABILITY POLICY.
A.

Introduction
It is undisputed that, on or about February 6, 1980,

the date of the accident giving rise to the instant action,
there existed, in full force and effect, a "Country Squire"
comprehensive liablity insurance policy between Appellant and
Respondent (R. 132, 133, 135).

Pursuant to the "Farmers-

Ranchers Liability" coverage portion of said policy, it was
provided that:
"This policy agreement does not apply:
2. Under Coverages Fl (Bodily Injury
Liability), F2 (Premises Medical), G (Property
Damage Liability), H (Employer's Liability), I
(Medical Payments--Employee), or J (Medical
Payments--Named Persons) to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, operation, or use, loading or
unloading of:
b. Any automobile owned or operated by or
rented or loaned to any insured. But this
subjection (b) does not apply to bodily
injury or property damage occurring on the
insured premises if the motor vehicle is not
subject to motor vehicle registration,
because it is used exclusively on the
insured premises."

-4-
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Said policy further defines the term "automobile" as
follows:
"Automobile means a land motor vehicle trailer
.
' does not
'
or semi-trailer,
but the word automobile
~nclude any crawler or farm-type tractor, farm
implement and, if not subject to motor vehicle
registration, any equipment, which is designed
for use principally off public roads."
Pursuant to the above-cited language, where it can be
established that the vehicle involved was either a "farm
implement" or "equipment" which is not subject to Utah's motor
vehicle provisions and is designed to be principally used off
public roads it will not be considered an ''automobile" and the
policy will apply.
Respondents join with the lower court in its decision
that the feeder unit in question herein is not an "automobile",
and that it is a "farm implement not subject to Utah motor
vehicle registration and design[ed] for use principally of
public roads" (R. 135).

Respondents assert that said lower

court decision was correct and should be upheld.

Respondents

further assert, for the reasons set forth hereinbelow, that
Appellant has not and cannot sustain the burden of establishing
that the lower court's decision was incorrect as a matter of
law, and urge the Court herein to-summarily dismiss Appellant's
appeal.

-5-
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B. Insurance Policies are to be Construed Strictly Against the
Issuing Company Giving Insured Broadest Protection.
6

Initially, in scrutinizing the lower court's decision
and in considering the issues presented on appeal herein, it is
vital that this court remain cognizant of the rules and
procedures to be applied in resolving contractual
interpretation disputes.
It is a universally accepted rule of contract law that
in those instances where a contract or a portion thereof, is
found to be ambiguous or unclear, the ambiguous portion is to
be construed most strongly against the party drafting the
document.

Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d

98, 306 P.2d 773 (1967).

As noted in 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance

§271 (1969), this rule of law is particularly applicable to
insurance contracts and policies:
"The general rule applicable to contracts
generally, that a written agreement should in
case of doubt as to the meaning thereof be
interpreted against the party that has drawn it,
is very frequently applied to policies of
insurance.
It constitutes an important rule of
construction in such respect.
In view of the
fact that ordinarily and in practically all
cases, it is the insurer who furnishes or
prepares the policies used to embody insurance
contracts. The general rule is that terms in an
insurance policy which are ambiguous, equivocal,
or uncertain to the extent that intention of the
parties is not clear and cannot be ascertained
clearly by the application of the ordinary rules
of construction, are to be construed strictly and
most strongly against the insurer and liberally
in favor of the insured so as to effect- the
dominant purpose of identity or payment to the
insured."

-6-
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The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and applied this
principal in numerous cases involving insurance policy
construction.

Said Court, in Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance

Co. of New York, 106 Utah 184, 191, 147 P.2d 319, 322 (1944),
stated:
"It is to be granted that a contract in case
of ambiguity must be construed against the party
who drew it and especially is that so in the case
of contracts which are sold widely to the average
man under sales talk which cannot be too
technical in its expositions and yet which very
easily lull him into a belief that he has
purchased certain benefits which on closer
scrutiny of the contract are asserted not to be
included."
See, e.g., American Casualty Co. of Redding, Pa. v. Eagle Star
Ins. Co., Ltd., 568 P.2d 731 (Utah 1977); Christensen v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 443 P.2d 385 (1968).
There can be no doubt that substantial ambiguity
exists in the present insurance policy and such uncertainty
constitutes the basis of this action and appeal.

Consequently,

the Court herein must, in its consideration of this appeal,
apply the rule as stated in Handley, and construe all
ambiguities in the subject policy in Respondent's favor.
Similarly, the decision of the lower court should be viewed and
scrutinized with recognition for the application of this most
important rule of law.

-7-
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C. The Subject Feeder Unit is a "Farm Implement" and not an
"Automobile" Under the Terms of the Subject Insurance Policy. ·
In accordance with the holding in the lower court and
as outlined hereinbelow, the subject feeder unit is a "farm
implement" under the terms of the subject insurance policy,
thereby constituting a specific exception to the policy's
definition of "automobile" (R. 132, 135, 136).
While Utah law is silent as to what constitutes a
"farm implement", Utah Code Ann. §41-1-l(m) (1953) provides a
definition of the term "Implement of Husbandry":
"Implement of Husbandry." Every vehicle
which is designed for agricultural purposes and
exclusively used by the owner thereof in the
conduct of his agricultural operations."
In light of the accepted definitions of both terms, the
vehicles encompassed under "farm implement" and "implement of
husbandry" are suffciently similar, if not in fact identical.
The common definition of "husbandry" is agriculture
including both farming and livestock.
Dictionary.

See Webster's

Similarly, Utah Code Ann. §59-5-58 (1953), defines

· agricultural use in terms of ''raising of plants and animals
useful to man including ... grains and feed crops ... livestock,
including beef cattle, sheep, swine, horses .... "

Thus, the

meaning of "farm implement" would be similar, if not the same,
as the meaning of "implement of husbandry".

-8-
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It is also relevant to note the unofficial Opinion of
I

the Attorney General of the State of Utah dated September 12,
1982, (R. 105-106), a copy of which is attached as Appendix "A"
hereto.

That Opinion construed the above-noted statutory

section to mean that a vehicle originally constructed for
non-agricultural purposes but adapted and modified for
agricultural purposes and used exclusively for agricultural
purposes is an "implement of husbandry" within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann., Sections 41-1-l(m) and 41-l-19(c).
Pursuant to the above-cited definition and Opinions,
two requirements must be met in order for a vehicle to qualify
as an "Implement of Husbandry".
(a)

Those requirements are:

the vehicle must be designed for agricultural

purposes; and,
(b)

the vehicle must be used exclusively by the owner

in the conduct of his agricultural operations.
In the instant case, as evidenced by the facts as
outlined by Appellants and supplemented above, the feeder unit
was and is designed solely for the purpose of delivering and
distributing feed to livestock; a specialized agricultural
function.

The facts further show that the said unit was used

exclusively for that specified and specialized function.
The record reveals that Respondents, in an effort to
improve the efficiency of their farm operatioris~- acquired the
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feeder unit to assist in their manual feeding operations and
used it to eliminate much of the hand labor associated
therewith.

Respondents further testified that: they did not use

the feeder unit for any other purpose and that it would not be
economical to use

t~.e

same to haul grain or run errands

(Deposition of Neldon Andrews, p. 25).

Respondents have and do

operate registered trucks for those purposes (Deposition of
Orvil Andrews, p. 23).
Such testimony clearly establishes that the subject
unit was designed for a specific agricultural purpose and was
used exclusively in connection with Respondent's agricultural
operations, as required by statute.

Consequently, the subject

feeder unit meets the Utah requirements for an "Implement of
Husbandry", it is a "farm implement" and not an "automobile",
and is, therefore, encompassed by Appellant's insurance policy.
In support of this conclusion, see the case of Allred
v. Engelman, 123 Tex. 205, 61 S.W.2d 75 (1933).

Allred is a

Texas case wherein certain tank trucks, used for hauling water
for irrigation and gasoline to tractors in the fields were
determined to be "implements of husbandry" within the meaning
of a statute strikingly similar to Utah Code Ann. §41-1-19
(1953).

The Court in Allred stated:
"The Legislature evidently had in mind that
it was impossible to anticipate and expressly
describe every motor vehicle whose particular
design and use would make of it an implement of

-10-
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husbandry.
It did name the ones that readily
come t~ mind a~ implements of hu~pandry, and it
was evidently intended by the Legislature that
what other vehicles that might be implements of
husb~ndry could be well left to the facts of any
particular case, and it was obviously.for this
reason that the general term "implements of
husbandry" was added.
It is clear that the
purpose of the legislation was to exempt from
reg~stration all motor vehicles primarily
designed and used for agricultural purposes,
temporarily using the highways."

do

The rationale exhibited in Allred should be applied herein.
Appellant, in its brief, discusses the fact that the
feeder unit was used to transport feed on a public highway
eleven miles per day (5-1/2 miles each way) six days a week.
It is their assertion that the said unit thereby ceased being a
:t

farm implement and instead was transformed into a transport
vehicle.

Such an assertion is obviously contrary to the facts

present before the trial court.
:y.
d

There is no evidence of any kind that anything was
transported in the feeder unit without the intention of and
actually being fed to Respondent's lifestock.

There is,

similarly, no evidence that the subject unit was ever used for
any contrary purpose.

Additionally, there exists no threshold

requirement relating to frequency and extent of operation on
public roads or highways in either the term "farm implement" as
used in the policy or "implement of husbandry" as defined in
the above-cited statute.

It is common knowledge that many farm

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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implements such as tractors, hay wagons an? combines move on
0

and transport equipment and commodities on public roads without
changing their intended nature or character.
Appellant has undoubtedly insured farmers for years
and should certainly be expected to contemplate that farm
implements travel from farm to farm on public roads.

How else

could farmers farming non-contiguous pieces of property move
from field to field with their farm implements?

If plaintiff

had intended to exclude mobile farm implements, the policy
should have been written to specifically exclude them from
coverage.

That was appellant's prerogative in drafting the

policy and the logic of the rules of construction discussed
above.
The specific design of the feeder truck in question,
with its beaters, conveyors and spouts for moving and directing
feed, clearly make it an "implement of husbandry" or "farm
implement" used to feed livestock.

Given the plain meaning of

the words used, the feeder unit cannot reasonably be considered
an "automobile" as that term is defined by the subject
insurance policy, and the lower court's decision in that regard
must be upheld.

Should there be any doubt, the principals of

contract construction applicable to insurance policies dictate
that the court construe any and all ambiguities in favor of
Respondents herein and uphold the lower court's· decision.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant, in arguing that the subject feeder unit was

out

not a "farm implement," cites several cases from outside the
state of .Utah.

None of the cited cases consider statutes or

vehicles at all similar to those in question herein and all
cases so cited are wholly inapplicable to the issues to be

lse
decided herein.

Most notable in this respect is the case of

e
Nepstad v. Randall, 82 S.D. 615, 152 N.W. 2d 383 (1967),

ff
wherein the South Dakota Supreme Court held solely that "a
motor driven goft cart while being operated on a golf course is
not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the [South Dakota]
guest statute."

Nepstad v. Randall, Id.

@ 386.

The

inapplicability of this cite to the instant case is obvious.
The other cases cited by Appellant are of a similar nature and

m,

totally fail to of fer any assistance to the court in its

:ting

resolution of the instant appeal.

gof

D. The Subject Feeder Unit was "Equipment" not Subject to
Motor Vehicle Registration and Designed for use Principally off
Public Roads.

3ered

In addition to being properly classified as a "farm
implement", the lower court held that the subject feeder unit

?gard

constituted "equipment" not subject to motor vehicle

of

registration and designed for use principally off public roads

:ate

( R • 13 5 ) •
1.

Not subject to Motor Vehicle Registration.
The applicable Utah statutes relating to the

registration of motor vehicles is codified at Title 41 of the

-13-
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Utah Code Annotated.

That statute,· in relevant part, provides

as follows:
"Every motor vehicle, combination of
vehicles, trailer, and semitrailer, when driven
or moved upon a highway shall be subject to the
registration and certificate of title provisions
of this act except:
(c) Any implement of husbandry, whether of
a type otherwise subject to registration
hereunder or not, which is only incidentally
operated or moved upon a highway."
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-19 (1953).
As outlined above, there can be no doubt that the
subject feeder unit was an implement of husbandry.

It was

specifically designed for agricultural purposes; the mechanical
unloading and distribution of forage to cattle; and was
utilized exclusively by Respondents for that purpose.

As such,

it is fundamental that the vehicle, so designed and used, is
not subject to the applicable registration statutes.
In the case of Allred v. Engleman, supra,

@ 422,

in

holding that certain water and gasoline carrying trucks were
not subject to state vehicle registration, the Court stated:
"The further contention is made that these
vehicles were not temporarily moved or operated
upon the highways, but that they were permanently
operated upon the highways, and being so used
they were not subject to the exemption from
registration.
The highways were used by these
vehicles, according to the statement of facts,
only in passing from orchard to orchard, or from
the source of supply of the water to the
particular orchard where the water was discharged

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for irrigating purposes.
Such use of the
highways was inevitable because o•f the manner in
wh~ch the tract as a whole is cut up and
criss-crossed by the roads. Because it so
happens, under the facts in this case· that there
was laid out across a portion of this' tract of
~and, one or.more highways, which necessarily
interfered with the operation of these trucks by
the owner thereof, in carrying out his
agricultural enterprises upon the land, and
compelled him temporarily to operate his trucks
upon these highways, would not have the effect to
subject vehicles to registration when the same
vehicles, if used wholly on one tract of land and
never touching the highways, would. not be subject
to registration. The Legislature has defined
"temporary" use of the highways as "the operation
or conveying between different farms." The facts
of this case seem clearly within that definition."
Although the Court in Allred utilized the term
"temporarily" instead of "incidentally", as found in the
applicable Utah Statute, the obvious intent is the same.

The

test is not whether it is necessary to go on a public road to
get from one field to another, but rather, whether it is
necessary to go on a public road to perform the function for
which the farm implement is designed.
This analysis and rationale comports with the Utah
statutes in this area.

Indeed, if that were not the case,

paragraph c of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-19 (1953) would be entirely
unnecessary in light of paragraph b's registration exemption
for "any vehicle which is driven or moved upon a highway only
for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property to
another".

Surely, if the Utah legislature had not intended
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that farm implements be given the latitude suggested by
Respondents, it would have so stated.
In the present case, contrary to

App~llant's

implications, it was not necessary that the feeder unit go on a
public road to perform its intended function.

Its use thereon

was merely incidental to its operation and necessitated only
because of the location of certain of Respondent's animals.
Clearly, therefore, pursuant to the applica.ble registration
statutes, the Respondents' vehicle was not in any way subject
to the Utah State motor vehicle registration requirements.
It should again be noted that none of the applicable
Utah statutes set any criteria as to distance that can be
traveled on a public highway by an exempt vehicle.

Said

statutes merely require that the operation thereon be
"incidental".

The undisputed evidence is that for ten years

the feeder truck was used by defendants exclusively on and
about their 2800-acre ranch or the property adjacent thereto or
across the road therefrom.
25.)

(Deposition of Orvil Andrews, page

Any use on the public road was incidental to the cattle

feeding purposes for which the feeder truck was designed.
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, and in
accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 41-1-19(c)
(1953), Respondents assert that the lower court was correct in
its decision that the feeder unit in question herein was not
subject to Utah motor vehicle registration.

-16-
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2.

Designed for use principally off public roads.

It is undisputed that, at the time of the subject
accident, the feeder unit in question was exclusively designed
to unload and deliver forage to cattle in a particular way with
a minimum of hand labor and at greater speed and efficiency.
It is similarly undisputed that Respondents, at no time,
attempted to feed or maintain their cattle on public roads or
highways.

As such, it is obvious that the subject feeder unit

was designed for use principally off public roads.
Considering essentially the same issue as presented
herein, the Texas Supreme Court in Allred v. Engleman reached
the same result as noted above.

In that case an issue was

raised as to whether the trucks with water and gas tanks
installed were designed primarily for agriculture use as
opposed to use on public highways.

The court considered the

uses of the respective vehicles and concluded that the water
trucks provided irrigation water to otherwise dry land and that
the gas trucks provided fuel for tractors in the field without
which the tractors would be useless.

The Court, referring to

the water and gas trucks, said, "While they might conceivably
be put to other uses they were designed primarily and used
exclusively for agricultural purposes."

Pursuant to that

statement, the Court went on to hold that the trucks were, as a
result, designed for use principally off public· highway and not
subject to highway motor vehicle registration.
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In the present case, there can be no question but that
the feeder unit was used exclusively for agricultural
purposes.

In accordance with the holding in Allred, the Court

herein must uphold the lower court and find that the subject
feeder unit was designed for use principally off public roads.
This conclusion is similarly mandated by the language
contained within the subject insurance policy.

As noted above,

that policy states that an excempt vehicle is one "which is
designed for use principally off public roads."

It does not

say that the vehicle must be used primarily off public roads.
Obviously, the policies language and intent centers around the
purpose for which the vehicle was designed and not its
occasional non-conforming use.
In the instant case, the vehicle was specifically
designed to directly feed cattle by mechanically unloading and
depositing feed in mangers or on the ground.

The above-quoted

language does not, as written, prohibit use on the highway as
appellant urges.

If such a prohibition were intended, the word

"designed" would have to have been omitted.

Insofar as it has

been included however, the obvious intent of the provision is
to look to the use for which the vehicle is designed, not
whether it is capable of, or in fact, used on a public road.
As noted numerous times above, the subject unit was clearly
designed for use off public roads and must be considered as
such by the Court herein.
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The feeder unit in question is, a~ noted above, exempt
0

from motor vehicle registration and is designed for feeding
cattle; a use which is principally performed off public
highways.

As such, the subject vehicle clearly qualifies as a

piece of "equipment" not subject to Utah highway registration
and designed principally for off road uses.

Pursuant thereto,

it constitutes an exemption from the term "automobile" and is

encompassed by the terms of the subject insurance policy.
Respondents assert, therefore, that the lower court was correct
in its decision and urge this Court to summarily dismiss
Appellant's appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Respondents
assert that the subject vehicle is not an "automobile" pursuant
to the terms of the applicable insurance policy, that the
policy should apply and protect Respondents herein and that the
lower court was entirely correct in it's decision in that
regard.

It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that

Appellant has not established the required burden of showing
reversible error as a matter of law, and consequently, the
lower court's holding must be upheld and not reversed and
Appellant's appeal herein must be summarily dismissed.
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
---------------~----------~------~--

UNOFFICIAL OPINION .

STATUTES EXEMPTING FARM VEHICLES AND IMPLEMENTS
OF HUSBANDRY FROM THE REQUIREMENT
OF REGISTRATION MUST BE
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
September 12. 1962
Mr. A.O. Vlhiting
Garland
Utah

Dear Sir:
We have been asked for an opinion on the following questipn: Is a vehicle
originally constructed for non-agricultural purposes, but adapted and modified
for agricultural purposes and now used exclusively therefor. an "implement of
husbandry" within the mean_ings of 41-1-1 {m) and 41-1-19 (c) of the U. C.A. 1953?
41-1-1 (m) defines an implement of husbandry as "(e)very vehicle which is
designed for agricultural purposes and exclusively used by the owner thereof in
the conduct of his agricultural operations."

41-l-19{c) allows for "(a}ny implement of husbandry, whether of a type otherwise subject to registration hereunder or not, which is only incidentally operated
or moved upon a highway. "
Our conclusion is that such a vehicle would be covered by these sections
and thus exempted from registration requirements.
The trend today in most jurisdictions is to allow an exemption in doubtful
cases. In Re Slade's Estate, 122 Cal. 434, 55 Pac. 158 and Allred v. Engleman,
Inc. 1 Tex. Civ. App., 54 S. W. 2d 352. These excerpts from the last named
case are revealing:
"Statutes exempting farm vehicles and implements of husbandry
from the requirment of registration must be liberally construed.''
" Implements of husbandry is a braod term and must include
every machine, tool or implement used to advance farming
interest and property."
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Our statute presents a special problem with its requirement that a vehicle
be designed for agricultural purposes. However, "design" does not refer exclusively to the construction of the original designer but should also be construed
to have reference to the product of any individual who ywrked on, remodeled
or modified the vehicle at any time in its history. This being the case, the person
who adapted it for its current use would be considered a designer within the
meaning of this statute.
0
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